

The logo features a large, solid orange semi-circle. The word "iter" is written in white, lowercase, sans-serif font, centered within the semi-circle.


iter

china eu india japan korea russia usa

PLC workshop at ESS
29-30 August 2013
PLC systems: Availability & Safety


Alvaro Marqueta – IFMIF
Antonio Vergara – ITER








Siemens S7-400-FH for slow interlocks





S7-400

S7-300

PLC

Ready

SIMATIC Safety Matrix - [SM_Demo -- SM_ISA_N\Plant ESD]

File Edit View Tools Window Help

SIMATIC SAFETY MATRIX


All Groups
All Groups
Multiple Groups
01 - High Pressure SIF
02 - High Tank Level SIF
03 - Low Hopper Level SIF
04 - High Tank Temp SIF
05 -
06 -

Select

Input Tag	Func	Limit/Trip	EngUnit	Cause Description	Num	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
PS_100		FALSE		Feed Pump High Pressure Switch	1	N													
LSH_100		TRUE		Tank_100 Level switch high	2	2S	S	S	R	2N									
LSL_200		TRUE		Hopper_200 Level switch Low	3		N	N	2S										
PSH_200		TRUE		Hopper_200 High Pressure	4		N	N	V										
PT_100		H 38.00	PSIG	Feed pressure	5	S	S	S											
LT_100		H 50.00	Feet	Tank Level	6	2S	N	N		2N									
PT_101		H 26.00			7				N	2N	S								
PT_102	Vote	D 3.0	in_H20	Tank Pressure															
PT_103																			
LT_200		H 50.00	Ft	Hopper Level	8				2S										
TS_101		FALSE																	
TS_102	AND	FALSE																	
TS_103		FALSE		Tank_100 High Temperature switch	9														

Tank Pressure => close: Hopper Fe

3S



- ✓ Between F-CPU and F-I/O
 - Profibus protocol
 - Additional safety shell on top: PROFI-safe
- ✓ Between two F-CPU
 - Standard protocol (Ethernet, Profibus-DP/PA)
 - Additional safety shell on top


Threats	Protective mechanisms
Repetition	Sequence number
Deletion	Sequence number
Insertion	Sequence number
Incorrect sequence	Sequence number
Corruption	CRC signature
Timing errors	Periodically sent messages Watchdog
Masquerade/Usurper	Identification procedure



Fail safe reaction:

- Application of substitute values
- F-I/O passivation





Central interlock function requirements:


- Integrity: SIL3 loop has to be guaranteed (safety-related protocol/hardwiring)
- Dependability: tolerance to 'easy-triggering'
 - 99.9% inherent availability
 - 99.6% overall reliability, over two 8h-shifts
- Time-outs: imposed to up to 1sg

Problems appear when:


- Integrity: SIL3 loop has to be guaranteed ('cheating' not allowed...)
- Safety-related protocol behaves like a master-slave fieldbus protocol
- Increasing number of communication partners (Plant Interlock Systems) with each central module

Evolution of CIS test platform:

- 1) First proto: slow and fast prototype (2010-2011)
- 2) First discharge loop prototype: CERN (2011-2012)
- 3) Intensive prototype campaign: 2013 -
 - TCS (India)
 - CERN
 - ASIPP (China)
 - RF-DA
 - Delft Tech.University
 - KO-DA



ICS SLOW
TEST



CIS test platform: based on CPU siemens S7 414-4H

- Almost all possible configurations covered
- Local and Central interlock functions executed (including I/O)
 - Simple logic applied to I/O signals
- Works mostly focused on behavior of safety communications
- Several test campaigns have been performed

Main parameters measured:


- Execution time for all communications, from the first block to the last
- Execution time of the safety part of the code (safety processing + safety communications)
- Longest CPU cycle execution time
- Execution time for local/central function, including physical I/O

1st test campaign:

- Communications simulated: several-1 block (20 bits) to various partners (contracts)
- Several parameter configurations where tested, in order to learn how to optimize communications:
 - Priorities of different function blocks
 - Interval of execution times for function blocks
- Tested different operating configurations (failure, loss of redundancy, etc)
 - Exec.time in normal mode
 - Exec.time after loss of CPU
 - Exec.time without redundancy
 - Exec.time during resynchronization


1st test campaign:

- Communication times
 - For 10 partners
 - Decreasing cycle time
 - Increasing priority




1st test campaign:


➤ 'H' configuration seems to introduce important delays



1st test campaign:

- Delay after 'Power Off'
 - Recovery time becomes unacceptable






1st test campaign:


➤ Execution time for local and central function; close to the limits

2nd test campaign:

- Keeping same configuration, increasing number of partners
- From 8 comm.blocks (3 contracts)
- Up to 30 comm.block (5 contracts)

➤ Up to 15 partners,
Reasonable performance






➤ Execution time for local and central function; close to the limits

Average CPU execution times:


	414-4H	414-5H	416-5H	417-5H
Fixed.p.	45 ns	18,7 ns	12,5 ns	7,5 ns
Float.p.	135 ns	37,5 ns	25 ns	15 ns

- Following analysis by Nacho...




New hardware campaign:


- CPU: 417-5H
- 14 comm. blocks
- Important reduction in time



Resync



Power Off



Initial conclusions:

- Critical management of time-outs
- Resynchronization: very dependent on the volume of data managed
- Failure in one CPU does not affect the performance of the others or the network
- Correct tuning of the CPU parameters is essential to optimize CPU and communications throughput
- But, only CPU was changed, other pieces of hw could be improved as well

Communications using S7 safety profile:

- Seems more disadvantages than advantages
- gets worse with traffic in the network
- possibility to switch to distributed I/O for critical signals
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