



EUROPEAN
SPALLATION
SOURCE



TBL Motion Safety System (as part of the Common MCA Project)

Instrument Safety Readiness Review TBL

PRESENTED BY THOMAS GAHL

2025-10-10

Agenda



- 1 Instrument Hazard Analysis (IHA)
- 2 Risk Analysis & Treatment
- 3 Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)
- 4 E-Stop Design
- 5 Design Verification
- 6 E-Stop Design Implementation & Installation at TBL
- 7 Validation
- 8 Operation
- 9 Summary
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Instrument Hazard Analysis (IHA)



TBL Reference Documents:

ESS-3078238 - TBL Instrument Hazard Analysis (IHA)



Instrument Hazard Analysis

Handover of hazard treatment to Motion Safety

- Two risks in the IHA identified; classified as CX3 (in maintenance)
- Transferred to Motion Safety WU of CMCA;
- Both are in the Bunker area with no access of user personnel

List conventional hazards related to the various parts and areas of the instrument. See blue heading's comments for more information on each column.				Neutron Instruments Hazards Analysis						
				Component						
Hazard number	Building	Instrument Area	Instrument Sub-area	Instrument System Designation	Sub-System Designation	Component name	Maintenance			
							Level of Risk	Controls to mitigate risk	Action Owner	
ConHaz7	D03	In-Bunker	Heavy stand	Beam Transport and Conditioning System	Beam geometry conditioning	Adjustable Collimator				
ConHaz20	D03	In-Bunker	Light Stand	Beam Transport and Conditioning System	Beam filtering System	Filter Station	CX3	Tolerable	Risk mitigation is transferred to the Motion Safety Work Unit of the common MCA Project (CMCA)	
							CX3	Tolerable	Risk mitigation is transferred to the Motion Safety Work Unit of the common MCA Project (CMCA)	

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Risk Analysis & Treatment



TBL Reference Documents:

ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron
Instruments

Risk Analysis & Treatment

ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments



■ Limits of System

1. Area: Motion Safety focusses on areas accessible to instrument users (typically in the cave).
2. Life phases: Experiment Setup & Local Maintenance considered.

Life phases	Cave (User Access, controlled by PSS)	Cave (Service & Maintenance Access, controlled by PSS)	Beam Line, Bunker (Service & Maintenance Access, controlled by procedures)
TBL Areas	TBL Cave	TBL Cave	TBL In-bunker area
Installation, commissioning and testing	excluded	excluded	excluded
Experiment Run	no risks	no risks	no risks
Experiment Setup	included	N/A (no access)	N/A (no access)
Local maintenance	included	included	excluded
External maintenance (in workshop)	excluded	excluded	excluded

		Document Type: Risk Assessment Document Number: ESS-5467337 Date: Aug 23, 2024 Revision: 1 State: Released Confidentiality Level: Internal Page: 1 (17)												
MOTION RISK ANALYSIS OF NEUTRON INSTRUMENTS														
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Name</th> <th>Role/Title</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Owner</td> <td>Alexandre Gonçalves Gerk</td> <td>Automation Engineer – Motion Control and Motion Safety</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Reviewer</td> <td>Maurice Looft Jörgen Johansson Federico Rojas</td> <td>Equipment Compliance Automation Engineer – Expert for Motion Control on Neutrons Instruments</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Approver</td> <td>Thomas Gahl</td> <td>Motion Control and Automation Group Leader</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Name	Role/Title	Owner	Alexandre Gonçalves Gerk	Automation Engineer – Motion Control and Motion Safety	Reviewer	Maurice Looft Jörgen Johansson Federico Rojas	Equipment Compliance Automation Engineer – Expert for Motion Control on Neutrons Instruments	Approver	Thomas Gahl	Motion Control and Automation Group Leader
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Approver	Thomas Gahl	Motion Control and Automation Group Leader												
Template Report ESS-000047 Rev. 4, Active date: Feb 20, 2020														

ESS-5467337

Risk Analysis & Treatment

ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments



- Simplified approach for hazard analysis and mitigation.
 1. Motion Safety focusses on areas accessible to instrument users (typically in the cave).
 2. Only two levels defined following the severity path; required Performance Levels a/b and c/d.




Figure 8 - Risk evaluation

Document Type		Risk Assessment																			
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Template Report ESS-000047 Rev. 4, Active date: Feb 20, 2020

ESS-5467337

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Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)



TBL Reference Documents:

ESS-1315508 - TBL Table-of-Motion, sheet 3



Safety Requirements Specification

Evaluation for TBL

Mitigation	Mitigation description
None	Not accessible (behind closed walls or enclosures)

Severity	Mitigation	Mitigation description	Treatment of Residual risk
HARMFUL	Safeguarding	Procedure, RAMS: LOTO and/or fence off	Training, signs, procedures
Harmless	Other	Procedure, RAMS: LOTO and/or fence off	N/A

ConHaz 7 + 20										Operation										Maintenance																			

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E-Stop Design



Reference Documents:

ESS-5846469 - Motion Safety Test Bench (ePlan)

E-Stop Design

Design Principle



- Modularity: Define different areas; match the area with the respective control cabinets; this includes standardised circuits in the cabinet and a Master/Slave hierarchy between (if applicable).
- Scalability: A scalable number of fixed installed E-Stop buttons + one Reset button in the areas accessible to normal users (i.e. the cave).
- Performance Level d as a matter of principle.
- Currently Stop Category 0 (STO); design work is ongoing for Stop Category 1 (SS1).

EN 60204-1	EN 61800-5-2
Stop category 0	Safe torque off (STO)
Stop category 1	Safe stop 1 (SS1)
Stop category 2	Safe stop 2 (SS2)


E-Stop Design

Design of E-Stop Circuit

Principle: Contactors are cutting power to the stepper motor drives


Performance Level d: How to achieve?

- Safety Relay
 - 2 channels
 - With detection of shorts across contacts
 - With detection of shorts to Earth
- Safety contactors
 - Siemens safety contactor type 3RH2262-2BB40
 - 2 in series
 - NC contact in feedback loop



E-Stop Design

Master / Slave



E-stop input

- Dual-channel operation with detection of shorts across contacts.
- Earth fault detection in circuit.
- Reset with falling edge

Slave input

- Dual-channel operation with detection of shorts across contacts.
- Earth fault detection in circuit.
- No special cable necessary (just shielded)
- Auto-Reset

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Design Verification





Reference Documents:

ESS-5830036 - Design Verification & Test Report
for Motion Safety E-Stop Circuit

ESS-5846488 - Design Verification Calculation
(SISTEMA) for Motion Safety E-Stop Circuit

Design Verification

Functional Verification – Test Bench




Design Verification

SISTEMA calculation

The SISTEMA analysis for the Motion Safety – E-Stop Circuit has been successfully completed according to EN ISO 13849-1:2023 and ISO 13850:2015.

- The required Performance Level determined by the risk graph was PLd, with a calculated PFH = $1.45E-7$ [1/h]; PLd was achieved.
- All subsystems (Pilz E-Stop Boxes, Pilz PNOZ relay, and Siemens SIRIUS contactor relays) demonstrated compliance with relevant requirements for Category 3 or 4 architectures, with high MTTFD values, diagnostic coverage $\geq 90\%$, and fulfilled Common Cause Failure (CCF) measures.
- No warnings or non-conformities were reported in SISTEMA's evaluation.
- Design of the Motion Safety E-Stop function meets the required safety integrity level.



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E-Stop Design Implementation & Installation at TBL



Reference Documents:

ESS-5513699 - System Block Diagram for TBL Motion Control

ESS-5346225 - TBL Motion Control 2 (In-Bunker) ePlan

ESS-5346226 - TBL Motion Control 3 (Cave I) ePlan

ESS-5346227 - TBL Motion Control 4 (Cave II) ePlan

ESS-5516374 - System Design Description - TBL Motion Control System


ESS-5595113 - TBL Quality Inspection Report

ESS-5846444 - MCA Self-Inspection Report for TBL Motion Control

ESS-5513746 - TBL Inspection & Test Plan/Report

Table of Motion

Area



Cave

Bunker Area

Table of Motion

Implementation of E-Stop Systems





Table of Motion

Location of E-Stop and Reset Buttons



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Validation



Reference Documents:


ESS-5846551 – Validation Plan/Report for Motion Safety on TBL MCC2

ESS-5846552 - Validation Plan/Report for Motion Safety on TBL MCC3 + MCC4

Validation

SS-EN ISO 13849-2

- A. ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments.
- B. ESS-1315508 - TBL Table-of-Motion (sheet 3).
- C. ESS-5830036 - Design Verification & Test Report for Motion Safety E-Stop Circuit.
- D. ESS-5846551 – Validation Plan/Report for Motion Safety on TBL MCC2.
ESS-5846552 – Validation Plan/Report for Motion Safety on TBL MCC3 + MCC4.





Validation

Validation Test Plans / Reports (MCC2-Bunker & MCC3/4-Cave)

2.3. Test Readiness

#	Reference Documentation	CHESS ID
[1]	TBL Instrument Hazard Analysis (IHA)	ESS-3078238
[2]	TBL Table-of-Motion (ToM), sheet 3	ESS-1315508
[3]	TBL Motion Control 3 (Cave I) ePlan TBL Motion Control 4 (Cave II) ePlan	ESS-5346226
[4]	System Design Description - TBL Motion Control System	
[5]	Design Verification & Test Report for Motion Safety E-	
[6]	Quality Inspection Documents 1. TBL Inspection & Test Plan/Report (new revision) 2. MCA Self-Inspection Plan for TBL Motion Control 3. TBL QC Electrical Inspection Report (new revision)	

Test under Fault Conditions:
We used the test on the test bench as
“test on a hardware model” as defined
in clause 9.1 of SS EN ISO 13849-2.

Both Validation tests
have been passed and
approved.

TEST CASES (TO BE) PERFORMED		SUMMARY FINDINGS				
		Pass	Fail	N/A	Signature of Tester	Date
1. Document Check & Visual Inspection		X			Safaa Zaki	2025-09-08
Comments:						
2. Behaviour after Shutdown		X			Safaa Zaki, Ruben Martinez	2025-09-08
Comments:						
3.1 Function of Master E-Stop circuit (MCC3)		X			Safaa Zaki, Ruben Martinez	2025-09-08
Comments:						
3.2. Function of Slave E-Stop circuit (MCC4)		X			Safaa Zaki, Ruben Martinez	2025-09-08
Comments:						
4. Test under Fault Conditions				X	Safaa Zaki	N/A
Comments:						

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Operation



Reference Documents:

ESS-5669198 - Operation Manual - MCU5001:
16Ax. Motion Control Cabinet



Operation

ESS-5669198 - Operation Manual - MCU5001: 16Ax. Motion Control Cabinet

- All three motion control cabinets on TBL (MCC2, MCC3, MCC4) are of the standardised type MCU 5001.
- Checks and LED indicator status tables during setup and E-Stop sequences are part of the Generic MCU 5001 Operation Manual.
- For the maintenance part this document is referring to ESS-5483415 - Service & Maintenance Plan for MCA Cabinets and Boxes.

Document Type	Manual	Date	Oct 2, 2025
Document Number	ESS-5669198	State	Released
Revision	2	Confidentiality Level	Internal

6. MAINTENANCE

Detailed information about the maintenance plan for all MCA cabinets and boxes is provided in [ESS-5483415](#), [7].

10. Check other status indicator LEDs on the safety relay for normal operation.

Status indicators	
●	FAULT
☼	IN1 Input circuit at S12 is closed.
☼	IN2 Input circuit at S22 is closed.
☼	OUT Safety contacts are closed and semiconductor output Y32 carries a high signal.

Sequence	E-Stop LED in door	LED on E-Stop 1	LED on E-Stop 2	LED on Reset button	LEDs on Safety Relay (In 1)	LEDs on Safety Relay (In 2)	LEDs on Safety Relay (out)	LEDs on Safety Relay (Reset)
Initial state	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	○
Push E-Stop button 1	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○
Push E-Stop button 2	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○
Pull E-Stop button 1	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	○
Pull E-Stop button 2	●	○	○	●	●	●	○	○
Push Reset button	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	Reset LED on safety relay is ON for the time the button is pressed

Table 3: E-Stop indicator sequence



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Summary

Motion Safety at TBL



Summary

- TBL Hazards on Moving Machinery has been transferred to Motion Safety (ConHaz 7 + 20).
- For experiment operation no hazards could be identified:
 - Bunker Area: Area is covered by shielding walls and blocks and is only accessible for service and maintenance.
 - Cave Area: No subsystems have been installed yet; evaluation needs to be done with each new installed subsystem and additional safety functions defined and designed if necessary.
- For maintenance Motion Safety is achieved by special training, procedures and dedicated Risk Assessments (RAMS) based on tasks or area including LOTO and/or fence off.
- An E-Stop system for Cave and Bunker area has been designed, verified, installed and validated.
- The whole process is documented with the documents submitted to this review.
- The system is ready for trial operation of the instrument.

Motion Safety at TBL



Applicable Standards

- SS-EN ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery – General Principles for design – Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction
- SS-EN ISO 13849 Safety of Machinery – Safety Related Parts of the Control System (Parts 1 and 2)
- SS-EN ISO 13850 Safety of Machinery - Emergency stop function - Principles for design
- SS-EN EN 60204-1 Safety of Machinery – Electrical Equipment of Machines
- SS EN 61800-5-2 Adjustable Speed Electrical Power Drive Systems Part 5-2: Safety Requirements - Functional




Thank You!

2025-10-10

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Additional Information

The auxiliary contacts of -KM1 and -KM2 are included in the reset loop of -K1.



The delayed contacts 37-38 and 47-47 are cutting the 24V DC to the two STO inputs of the stepper motor drive after a fixed time Δt adjustable at -K1.



Bifrost Motion Safety

Cabinet 3: MCU 5001a – 2 Safety Circuits (STO) for 12 Beckhoff + 2 Technosoft






Table of Motion

Structure

Sheet 1: Sub-System Requirements

Sheet 2: Components Selection

Sheet 3: Motion Safety Requirements

Sheet 4: Axes Distribution and Motion Control Cabinets Requirements

Sheet 5: Higher Control Requirements

