



DREAM Motion Safety System - Implementation and Left to Do

Instrument Safety Readiness Review DREAM

PRESENTED BY JACOB GILLIES
(ON BEHALF OF THE MOTION CONTROL & AUTOMATION GROUP)

2026-03-26

DREAM Motion Safety



Instrument Hazard Analysis & Handover to Motion Safety

- 2 risks in the IHA identified.
- Collimator risk relates to areas not accessible except during prescribed maintenance events.
- Polariser translation arm (Aka Guide changer) is in a controlled but accessible area and is addressed by motion safety
- Sample stage assessment not included during this phase



Hazard number	Building	Instrument Area	Instrument Sub-area	Instrument System Designation	Sub-System Designation	Nr	Hazard Category (mechanical, chemical, ergonomic)	Person affected	Initiating event	Accident description	Consequence
ConHaz23	D01	Secondary Spectrometer	Collimator slits	Beam_Transport_and_Spatial_Conditioning	Beam geometry conditioning	23	HazMechanical	ESS Staff	Slits moving under maintenance	Pinched finger	Injury
Polar	D01	Secondary Spectrometer	Polarizer translation arm	Beam_Transport_and_Spatial_Conditioning	Beam geometry conditioning	58	HazMechanical	ESS Staff	Polarizer translation arm moving under maintenance	Motorized components	Injury



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Areas: Cave 1

- Accessibility Experimental Cave 1:
 - PSS Sensed manual Door
 - Access to Sample Area
- Accessibility Guide Changer:
 - Behind locked door within Cave 1; access only for maintenance.
- PSS Access Control is for both areas
- Main Hazards:
 - Unexpected motion of Guide changer during maint. and setup




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Safety Output Groups (SO)

- SO1 (in Cave 1):
 - Sample Environment axes connected to E-Stop bus to support future installation
 - To be reviewed during installation
- SO2 (in Cave 1):
 - Axes identified as hazardous within an accessible space.
 - Linked to special safety function.
 - Covers also maintenance scenario.
 - Special procedures apply when maintenance work makes it necessary to override these safety functions.





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Safety Output Groups (SO)

DREAM Motion Safety System – Axis List

MCC2			MCC3		
SO2			SO1		
QA401/2			STO		
Pin	ID	Axis Description	Drive	Axis	Name
13	M1	Polariser Guide Changer	1	M1	Ancillary Axis SE 1
23	M2	Spare Axis 1	2	M2	Ancillary Axis SE 2
33	M3	Spare Axis 3	3	M3	Ancillary Axis SE 3
43	M4	Spare Axis 2	QA601/2		
53	N/A	N.C.	Pin	ID	Axis Description
83	N/A	N.C.	13	M4	Ancillary Axis SE 4
			23	M5	Ancillary Axis SE 5
			33	M6	Ancillary Axis SE 6
			43	M7	Ancillary Axis SE 7
			53	M8	Ancillary Axis SE 8
			83	M9	Spare Axis 1
			QA603/4		
			Pin	ID	Axis Description
			13	M10	Spare Axis 2
			23	M11	Spare Axis 3
			33	M12	Spare Axis 4
			43	M13	Spare Axis 5
			53	M14	Spare Axis 6
			83	N/A	Drive connected but not used

Safety Function	SO1	SO2
SF1 - E-Stop	X	X
SF2 – PSS Cave Access		X
SF3 – Access override		X




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Safety Functions (SF)

- SF1: Motion E-Stop
 - Stops all MCA axes in cave 1
- SF2: PSS Access
 - Stops all MCA axes in cave 1 identified as hazardous and grouped in SO2.
- SF3: Cave Pendant
 - Overrides SF2 and enables all axes in SO2
 - Pendant is located adjacent to SF2 axes to support maintenance tasks

DREAM Motion Safety System – Inputs and Logic (Safety Functions (SF))




Safety Function	SO1	SO2
SF1 – Motion E-Stop	X	X
SF2 – PSS Access		X
SF3 – Access Override Cave		X

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Cave Pendant

- SF3: Cave Pendant
 - Green indicator light shows that the pendant is connected and in control of SO2 Axes.
 - Push the illuminated white push button to activate SF3 and enable the axes.
 - Button will be illuminated during the period SF3 is active
 - Black operator stop button stops safely SF3 at any time pressed.



Operator Stop

- Twist or pull to reset

Connected

- Pendant is connected and in control
- Turns off when:
 - PSS signal goes high
 - Pendant disconnected
 - MCC2 switched off


Enable

- Press to Enable
- Illuminated when enabled



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Implementation






Validation Workflow

SS-EN ISO 13849-2

- A. ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments.
- B. ESS-3482344 - DREAM Table-of-Motion, sheet 3
- C. ESS-6020377 - Design Verification Calculation (SISTEMA) for DREAM Motion Safety
- D. ESS-6017650 - Motion Safety Validation Plan for DREAM
ESS-6017649 - Motion Safety Validation Report for DREAM



DREAM Motion Safety

Validation Test Plan / Validation Test Report

Validation test has been passed and approved:

- No test case failed
- 1 Punch List item converted to an NIT
- NIT-703 TA701/2/3 STO not validated
 - Requires installation of sample env. axes

ITEM	DESCRIPTION / TEST CASE REFERENCE	NCR / NIT	CATEG.	RESPONSIBLE	COMPLETION DATE
1	TA701/2/3 STO not validated. To be validated during installation of sample stack motors.	NIT-703	e	Jacob Gillies	ORR

TEST SUMMARY & APPROVAL

Validation Test Execution Approved Rejected
 Date: 2026-03-16 Signature: _____
 Comment: All listed test cases passed. Recommend for approval

Validation Approval Approved Rejected
 Date: Mar-13, 2026 Signature: Jacob Gillies
 Comment: No Safety relevant issues have been raised. NIT raised for outstanding STO test. Recommend for approval

Test Cases performed	Summary Findings					
	Pass	Fail	N/A	Signatures of testers	Date	Comments
1 Hardware Check	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	Cabinet drawings out of date, V4 digital drawings used
2 Output Tests MCC3	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	
3 Fault Tests MCC3	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	Output test wiring was in place. Operation re-confirmed during 6-Functional Tests. TA70x STOs to be validated during install/commissioning of the Sample Stack. NIT added.
4 Output Tests MCC2	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	
5 Fault Tests MCC2	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	
6 Functional Tests	X			Manuel Regoli Erdinch Ahmed Jacob Gillies	Mar 11, 2026	Confirmed PSS relay activated by "Searched and Locked" on Mar 12, 2026

UNCONTROLLED COPY: ESS-6017649, Rev. 1, page 6(2)



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Exclusions

- MCC1 (for in bunker):
 - Instrument Shutter (Pneumatics): Access only for maintenance, trained personnel, LOTO, RAMS; provision to temporarily connect an operator stop (Motor only).

- MCC2 (Cave 1):
 - Collimation Slit Sets (Sealed within collimation tube): Access only for maintenance, trained personnel, LOTO, RAMS.

DREAM Motion Safety



Left to do

- Current situation
 - Largest generic hazard is the “Unexpected Startup/Motion of Axes” while people are working on or near the Polariser guide changer.
 - This is addressed by PSS Access and Override/Enable functions.
 - Awaiting Installation of the sample environment to complete STO tests and assess for new hazards
 - This is good and safe enough for next phase (trial operation = hot commissioning) with skilled and trained users familiar with the system.

- Next steps
 - Be available and support the hot commissioning phase for troubleshooting.
 - Evaluate the suitability of the system for daily routine.
 - Get feedback from the users of the acceptance and the user-friendliness of the system.

- Improvements: A question for all T1 instruments
 - Design improvements for the safety control system are in the pipeline for later instruments.
 - Decide how much of this is worth to retrofit (and when) on T1 instruments.

DREAM Motion Safety



Reference Documents

Analysis &
Requirements

- ESS-0544185 - DREAM Instrument Hazard Analysis (IHA)
- ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments
- ESS-3482344 - DREAM Table-of-Motion, sheet 3

Design

- ESS-5513694 - System Block Diagram for DREAM Motion Control
- ESS-4230734 - DREAM Motion Control 1 ePlan
- ESS-4230737 - DREAM Motion Control 2 ePlan
- ESS-4230739 - DREAM Motion Control 3 ePlan
- ESS-5516369 - System Design Description - DREAM Motion Control System
- ESS-6020377 - Design Verification Calculation (SISTEMA) for DREAM Motion Safety

Installation

- ESS-5594310 - Electrical inspection DREAM MC Cabinets
- ESS-6016375 - MCA Self-Inspection Report for DREAM Motion Control
- ESS-5513741 - Inspection and Test Report for DREAM Motion Control

Validation

- ESS-6017650 - Motion Safety Validation Plan for DREAM
- ESS-6017649 - Motion Safety Validation Report for DREAM

Operation

- ESS-5669198 - Operation Manual - MCU5001: 16Ax. Motion Control Cabinet
- ESS-5669200 - Operation Manual - MCU5003: Piezo Motion Control Cabinet
- ESS-5166392 - Motion Control Risk Assessment (RAMS)

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Applicable Directives and Standards

- EU Directive 2006/42/EC (European Machinery Directive)
- Replaced by: Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2023 on machinery

- SS-EN ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery – General Principles for design – Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction
- SS-EN ISO 13849 Safety of Machinery – Safety Related Parts of the Control System (Parts 1 and 2)
- SS-EN ISO 13850 Safety of Machinery - Emergency stop function - Principles for design

- SS-EN EN 60204-1 Safety of Machinery – Electrical Equipment of Machines

- SS-EN 61800-5-2 Adjustable Speed Electrical Power Drive Systems Part 5-2: Safety Requirements - Functional



Thank You!

2025-12-18

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Additional Information

Risk Analysis & Treatment

ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments



- Limits of System

1. Area: Motion Safety focusses on areas accessible to instrument users (typically in the cave).
2. Life phases: Experiment Setup & Local Maintenance considered.

Life phases	Cave (User Access, controlled by PSS)	Cave (Service & Maintenance Access, controlled by PSS)	Beam Line, Bunker (Service & Maintenance Access, controlled by procedures)
TBL Areas	TBL Cave	TBL Cave	TBL In-bunker area
Installation, commissioning and testing	excluded	excluded	excluded
Experiment Run	no risks	no risks	no risks
Experiment Setup	included	N/A (no access)	N/A (no access)
Local maintenance	included	included	excluded
External maintenance (in workshop)	excluded	excluded	excluded

		Document Type: Risk Assessment Document Number: ESS-5467337 Date: Aug 23, 2024 Revision: 1 State: Released Confidentiality Level: Internal Page: 1 (17)
MOTION RISK ANALYSIS OF NEUTRON INSTRUMENTS		
	Name	Role/Title
Owner	Alexandre Goncalves Gerk	Automation Engineer – Motion Control and Motion Safety
Reviewer	Maurice Looft Jørgen Johansson Federico Rojas	Equipment Compliance Automation Engineer – Expert for Motion Control on Neutron Instruments
Approver	Thomas Gahl	Motion Control and Automation Group Leader
<small>Template Report ESS-00087 Rev. 4, Active date: Feb 20, 2020</small>		

ESS-5467337

Risk Analysis & Treatment



ESS-5467337 - Motion Risk Analysis of Neutron Instruments

- Simplified approach for hazard analysis and mitigation.
 1. Motion Safety focusses on areas accessible to instrument users (typically in the cave).
 2. Only two levels defined following the severity path; required Performance Levels a/b and c/d.




Figure 8 - Risk evaluation

EUROPEAN SPALLATION SOURCE		Document Type	Risk Assessment
		Document Number	ESS-5467337
		Date	Aug 23, 2024
		Revision	1
		State	Released
		Confidentiality Level	Internal
		Page	1 (17)

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Reviewer	Maurice Looft	Equipment Compliance
	Jörgen Johansson	Equipment Compliance
	Federico Rojas	Automation Engineer – Expert for Motion Control on Neutron Instruments
Approver	Thomas Gahl	Motion Control and Automation Group Leader

Template Report ESS-000987 Rev. 4, Active date: Feb 20, 2020

ESS-5467337



E-Stop Design

Design Principle

- Modularity: Define different areas; match the area with the respective control cabinets; this includes standardised circuits in the cabinet and a Master/Slave hierarchy between (if applicable).
- Scalability: A scalable number of fixed installed E-Stop buttons + one Reset button in the areas accessible to normal users (i.e. the cave).
- Performance Level d as a matter of principle.
- Currently Stop Category 0 (STO); design work is ongoing for Stop Category 1 (SS1).

EN 60204-1	EN 61800-5-2
Stop category 0	Safe torque off (STO)
Stop category 1	Safe stop 1 (SS1)
Stop category 2	Safe stop 2 (SS2)

Design Verification

SISTEMA calculation

The SISTEMA analysis for the Motion Safety – E-Stop Circuit has been successfully completed according to EN ISO 13849-1:2023 and ISO 13850:2015.

- The required Performance Level determined by the risk graph was PLd, with a calculated PFH = $1.45E-7$ [1/h]; PLd was achieved.
- All subsystems (Pilz E-Stop Boxes, Pilz PNOZ relay, and Siemens SIRIUS contactor relays) demonstrated compliance with relevant requirements for Category 3 or 4 architectures, with high MTTFD values, diagnostic coverage $\geq 90\%$, and fulfilled Common Cause Failure (CCF) measures.
- No warnings or non-conformities were reported in SISTEMA's evaluation.
- Design of the Motion Safety E-Stop function meets the required safety integrity level.

SISTEMA
Safety Integrity Software Tool for the Evaluation of Machine Applications
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health of the German Social Accident Insurance (IFA), 2020

IFA
Institut für Arbeitsschutz der
Deutschen Gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung

Version of software: 2.0.8 Build 4
Version of standard: ISO 13849-1:2015, ISO 13849-2:2012
Version of VDMA database: VDMA 66413 1.0.0

[Information about the standard](#)

