ITSF 2019 - International Technical Safety Forum

13 May 2019, 11:00 → 17 May 2019, 13:15 Europe/Stockholm

Scandic Star Hotel

Andreas Hoppe (DESY), Bert Manzlak (Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility / Jefferson Lab), Enrico Cennini (ESHAC Committee), Fredrik Jörud (European Spallation Source ERIC), Helen Boyer (European Spallation Source ERIC), John E Anderson (Fermi Lab), Peter Jacobsson

The organising committee welcome you to Lund, Sweden, for the International Technical Safety Forum 2019 (ITSF 2019) and invites you to send in abstracts for the workshop, see topics in the meny or in the attached file.

The International Technical Safety Forum (ITSF) is a forum to exchange state of the art ideas, processes, procedures and technologies in personnel, environmental, and equipment safety from a variety of high-energy physics, spallation sources and synchrotron radiation laboratories throughout the world. This will be the 14th workshop int the ITSF history.

The topics of the workshop are: Incidents and lessons learned, Equipment certification, Risk assessment, Continuous improvement in HSE matters, New Projects and Challenges, Environmental Protection and sustainability, Communications, Incident/Accident Management, Technical risks, Safety culture and behavior, Fire Safety, Safety Training, Safety for complex shared research centres. More information of the topics can be found in the topic list document in the bottom of the page.
 
In 2019, the ITSF will be hosted by European Spallation Source ERIC (ESS) in Lund, Sweden. Lund is easily reachable by train (40 minutes) from the Copenhagen International Airport Kastrup (CPH).

The ITSF will begin Monday May 13th with a dedicated day for Fire Safety. That day, the workshop will be at the ESS site. The ordinary plenary sessions start on Tuesday the 14th of May. The workshop will be closed by Friday noon. During the week, tours of the ESS facility and the adjacent synchrotron MAX IV will be arranged. The conference program includes tutorials on selected topics, invited and selected talks, as well as poster sessions.

The workshop venue will be the Scandic Star Hotel, Lund.

ESS, which is currently under construction from, will when finished be the world’s brightest neutron source, powered by the world’s most powerful accelerator, a super-conductive linac. ESS is a European Research Infrastructure Consortium funded by 13 member countries across Europe, with Sweden and Denmark as host countries.

WELCOME

ITSF Organising Committee

Mike Bonkalski, Fermi Lab
Enrico Cennini, CERN
Andreas Hoppe, DESY
Sigrid Kozielski, ESS
Bert Manzlak, Jefferson Lab
Anne Trudel, TRIUMF
Peter Jacobsson, ESS (Chair)

15052019-360-14-RE.jpg

ITSF2019 Topics_v2.docx

Participants_ITSF-2019.xlsx

Poster_ITSF.png

Monday, 13 May

11:00 Registration and lunch

Light lunch (sandwiches)

Fire Safety

1 Introduction to Fire Safety Day - ITSF 2019

Introduction to Fire Safety Day - ITSF 2019 plus evacuation rules

Speaker: Peter Jacobsson

F.Jörud_Evacuation Plan[1].pptx

Presentation_Opening.pptx

2 Fire Protection at Jefferson Lab

Fire Protection at Jefferson Lab

Speaker: Mr Bill Rainey (Jefferson Lab)

First Responder Partnership.pptx

3 Fire Safety Design by Means of PBD. The FCC study case

Fire Safety Design by means of PBD. The FCC study case

The Future Circular Collider study aims at exploring and designing the required infrastructure and technology for an underground particle accelerator that would span 98km about 400m underground.
A Performance Based Design (PBD) process was launched to assist in the conceptual study phase by evaluating the foreseen safety measures regarding fire and smoke scenarios.

The PBD study stated the safety goals and performance criteria regarding three principal assets: Life Safety, Environment, Property and Continuity of Operation.

Life Safety goal, the first one assessed, was evaluated for occupants, emergency responders and victims (defined as impeded occupants that need to be rescued by the fire brigade). The process required brainstorming sessions with the stackeholders to find the best solutions while accounting for the project necessities and constrains.

The presentation at hand will share an overview of the entire process particularly focusing on the benefits and downsides of conducting this assessment in the early conceptual stage. Additionally it will show the methodology taken to study the survival probability of impeded occupants.

Despite these being a necessary step to build up the risk profile for further perform a cost-benefit impact of safety measures, its treatment is uncommon in the fire safety field. Generally, tenability limits based on visibility, temperature and heat flux are used as hard threshold to stablish the performance criteria; once occupants reached them the criteria is considered unfulfilled. However, in reality, occupants exposed to those limits do not automatically become fatalities but unimpeded evacuees. If a fire brigade intervene, there are some chances to rescue those people.

Given the simple scenario geometry from an evacuation standpoint, 1D egress model was coupled with FDS simulations to quantify the Fractional Effective Dose (FED) received by both, evacuating occupants and victims unable to self-evacuate. The fire rescue operation was also simulated by using some experimental data on blind interventions speeds. Different potential configurations of the in-house fire brigade (regarding locations and personnel) were tested to evaluate the potential benefit of each one.

The results of the overall process show the advantage and ability of PBD approach to design non-standard complex infrastructures that escapes the regulatory framework.

Speaker: Dr Saverio La Mendola (CERN HSE)

ITSF_FCC_CERN_HSE_16-9_slm.pptx

13:15 Short break

4 The FIRIA project: an integrated approach to address fire and fire-induced radiological release risks at CERN

The FIRIA (Fire-Induced Radiological Integrated Assessment) project was launched by CERN’s HSE Unit on January 2018 to address the needs of the Organization to guarantee a suitable level of safety of its research facilities with respect to life, environment and property.
The project aims to refine the methodological and physical assumptions in use at CERN though the development of a general framework of fire risk assessment appropriate for facilities which may contain radioactive materials during their service life. The findings of the project are expected to facilitate the prioritization of consolidation activities among CERN facilities and support the choice of mitigation strategies when the risk is not acceptable. State-of-the-art knowledge in areas including materials science, fire propagation, computational fluid dynamics, dispersion of pollutants, environmental modelling, radiation protection, quantitative risk analysis and computing will be applied.
The project is driven by a multidisciplinary team composed by CERN members of the Fire Safety Engineering team (HSE-OHS-XP), Radiation Protection group (HSE-RP), Fire Brigade (HSE-FB) and CFD team (EN-CV-PJ). International collaborations have also been established and actively contribute with state-of-the-art tools and approaches with respect to, for example, large scale outdoor dispersion modelling and small-scale experimental campaign to characterize typical combustible items in terms of soot production and heat release rate.
The target area of ISOLDE (Isotope mass Separator On-Line facility) has been chosen as a pilot case, to highlight the needs of refinement in the assumptions made to date and highlight pros and cons of using a quantitative risk assessment methodology with respect to a worst case approach or a scenario analysis.
The facility is currently being assessed by the FIRIA team from the fire and fire-induced radiological release standpoints and the first results of the analysis will be presented together with an overview of the activities of the project.

Speaker: Dr Giordana Gai (CERN Fire Safety Engineering Team)

190513_ITSF_FIRIA.pptx

5 Sprinkler test modulator oil fire

Test to prove the sprinkler capacity for the ESS Building G02 (Gallery)

Speaker: Mr David Winberg

ITSF ESS 2019.pptx

6 Fire Safety in Laser Labs at Jefferson Lab

At Jefferson Lab high-power lasers (Class 3B and Class 4) are used in research and accelerator operations. The laser safety program provides the methods used to mitigate the hazards posed by optical lasers that operate at wavelengths between 180 nm to 1mm. Jefferson Lab has developed engineering and administrative controls, warnings devices, and documented procedures to control the hazard issues associated with the use of lasers and maintains its fire protection and fire suppression systems and capabilities to minimize losses from fire and related hazards consistent with highly protected risk status. The fire protection program provides the procedures used to implement this commitment by incorporating fire safety into facility planning, operations, and maintenance activities, and work processes. Specifically, fire safety in laser labs objectives are to minimize the likelihood of occurrence of a fire related event; minimize the consequence of a fire related event affecting workers, environment, property and missions; provide a level of safety protection consistent with highly protected risk class; meet or exceed the requirements of Department of Energy Order 420.1C Facility Safety; Department of Energy Standard 1066-2016 Fire Protection using a graded approach. The presentation from the Jefferson Lab Laser Safety Officer will provide an overview of the fire protection program as it relates to laser labs.

Speaker: Bert Manzlak (Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility / Jefferson Lab)

ITSF 19 __ Bert Manzlak __ Fire Safety in Laser Labs at Jefferson Lab __ Day 1 _ May 13, 2019 _.pptx

14:40 Coffee break

7 The choice between single or multiple evacuation alarms in multi-hazard environments

Speaker: Prof. Enrico Ronchi

Ronchi - The choice between single or multiple evacuation alarms in multi-hazard environments.pptx

8 The SPS FIRE Project: a major fire safety consolidation in an aging facility to face future challenges.

The Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) is the second largest accelerator at CERN, a 450 GeV proton and heavy ion machine serving the North Area experimental area and playing a key role as an injector for the LHC (Large Hadron Collider). Commissioned in 1976, the SPS featured a fire safety concept dating from the 70’s, that remained unchanged until today and for which CERN management launched a fire safety consolidation study in 2015.

This presentation explores the findings of the consolidation study, the challenges of a fire safety consolidation project of a 40-year-old research machine and some of the lessons learned by CERN Fire Safety Engineering Team.

From a very early stage, the fire risk assessment carried out during the study phase, revealed a number of shortcomings in life safety objectives: occupant protection and firefighter safety did not comply with current standards and best practices. In addition, low levels of property protection showed not only potential damage beyond the SPS into upstream machines like the PS (Proton Synchrotron) but also a risk to the continuity of operations of machines and experimental areas located downstream the SPS.

In the absence of applicable or fit-for-purpose fire safety codes for large underground research facilities, technical solutions went through a Performance-Based Design exercise benchmarking potential trial designs with the existing situation. As in any retrofit project, operational and maintenance constraints factored heavily in the adopted solution which outstands as best effort from all stakeholders to reach a balanced result between operations, fire safety and budget.

A final word focuses on the lessons learned by CERN Fire Safety Engineering Team in this 11 million € fire safety project which stands as the largest and most ambitious fire safety initiative carried out at CERN.

Speaker: Art Arnalich (CERN)

SPSFIRE_ITSF_v0.14.pptx

16:00 Short break

9 Deterministic Fire Analysis

ESS approach

Speaker: Mr Victor Lindqvist (Lloyds Reg. Consultants)

10 Bunker Fire Analysis

Speaker: Daniel Rosberg (WSP)

ESS Bunker steel analysis.pptx

11 Current status of the Active Cells Fire Suppression System

Speaker: Mr Jameer Emamally

ESS Fire Conf 13-14 May - notes.pptx

17:25 Summary of Fire Safety ITSF 2019

Tuesday, 14 May

12 Opening of ITSF 2019

Speaker: Mr Peter Jacobsson (European Spallation Source ERIC)

Opening_ITSF_2019.pptx

13 ITSF 2019 - Welcome speech

ESS, a brand new high-energy physics facility in Europe.

Speaker: Ralf Trant (European Spallation Source ERIC)

ITSF 2019 - 190514 RT.pptx

10:00 Coffee break

New Projects and challenges

Convener: Enrico Cenni (CEA-Saclay)

14 Projects and Experiments Safety Support (PESS)

Projects at CERN cover the full spectrum of the Organization’s activities, from examples of relatively simple office renovations through to complex accelerator upgrades and experimental installations. The Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit of CERN follows the majority of these projects through its Projects and Experiment Safety Support (PESS) activity, which for each project nominates and provides a safety correspondent to support the project leader in the fulfilment of their safety-related responsibilities. This presentation will describe how this activity is organised and how an improvement plan is being implemented to improve its effectiveness and value, based on lessons learnt.

Speaker: Simon Marsh (CERN)

ITSF 2019 - PESS.pptx

15 Safe operation of the Wendelstein 7-X fusion experiment

The Wendelstein 7-X (W7-X) is a superconducting stellarator at IPP in Greifswald, which went into operation in 2015. The aim of W7-X is to demonstrate the fusion reactor relevance of the numerically optimized stellarator. It has been designed for performing high-energy plasma discharges in the range of some seconds up to 30 minutes in a steady state operation mode. The plasma is heated mostly by Electron Cyclotron Resonance Heating (ECRH) at 140 GHz with up to 9 MW. The first plasmas were produced in December 2015 starting with a few milliseconds and an energy of < 4 MJ. Since then three operational phases were performed with more than 3500 plasma experiments. In the last operational phase, which ended in October 2018, the plasma experiments reached up to an energy of 200 MJ and a duration of 100 s.
This work will give an overview about the main components (i.e. superconducting magnet system, different (future) heating systems, gas system) and its different potential hazards for the personnel safety and for the plant (investment protection). During the development of any component, a risk analysis has to be performed and measures for risk reduction are considered. These risks are controlled within different layers of protection. One layer of protection is the safety instrumented system/central safety system. The structure and the most important safety functions will be described in this talk.

Speaker: Dr Sven Degenkolbe (Max Planck Institute for Plasmaphysics)

ITSF2019.pptx

16 Conformity Approach for pressure equipment for High-Luminosity LHC – an update

CERN as an intergovernmental organisation establishes its own safety rules as required for its proper functioning. In the domain of pressure equipment, including for cryogenic service, the baseline approach within the CERN Safety Rules is full conformity with the European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED), including the appropriate involvement of a notified body, together with CE marking.
However, due to the nature of some of the equipment used within CERN’s facilities, as well as international collaborations with in-kind contributions from non-EU countries, full compliance with the PED may not always be readily achievable. This situation is foreseen in the CERN Safety Rules, and CERN’s Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit will then define the safety requirements applicable to such equipment, as well as any eventual additional compensatory measures, to ensure a commensurate level of safety as that which full compliance to the PED intends.
At ITSF 2017 an approach was presented for certain specific equipment items for the High Luminosity LHC project whereby the Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit would assume the equivalent responsibility and authority as a notified body in defining and assessing the conformity of the equipment to the applicable safety requirements. We will present an update on the current status and some of the learnings to date from this activity.

Speaker: Simon Marsh (CERN)

ITSF 2019 - HL-LHC conformity.pptx

17 A multi-hazard approach to structural safety: the POPS-B technical building

Building 245 at CERN is foreseen that will house the new Main Power Supply of the Proton Synchroton Booster (PSB) accelerator ring, in the frame of the 2 GeV energy increase requested by the Large Hadron Collider Injectors Upgrade (LIU) program.
This building is made of two parts: converter hall (two storey steel structure) and technical building (two storey concrete structure). Different rooms host capacitor banks, magnetic field measuring equipment, electric switchgears and UPS systems, pumping station equipment and electrical cabinets needed for its operation. A holistic approach was needed to deal with the required structural safety verifications, because of the presence of either industrial and natural hazards. In particular, significant fire risk is present in the converter hall and required a proper verification of the most exposed elements. Moreover, a relevant explosion risk is present in the technical building due to the presence of the capacitor banks. Natural hazards, such as earthquake, strong winds, etc., have been considered in the global structural assessment of the bearing elements.
This presentation shows the main steps of the required structural safety verification performed on this building with reference to the applicable standards, in particular the Eurocodes. The performance-based approach and the safety verification details of the main unprotected steel elements toward the fire action are illustrated. The case of a capacitor explosion is then presented, showing the characterization of the behaviour of the component and the identification of the failure modes. The computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation of the effects of a secondary explosion consequent to the identified worst case conditions are then presented. The evaluated blast mitigation measures, based on an optimization of the venting pattern, and the structural assessment of the concrete elements by means of non-linear finite element modelling is shown. Finally, the structural analyses for the horizontal loads due to the design earthquake are presented.

Speaker: Giordana Gai (CERN Fire Safety Engineering Team)

190514_ITSF_POPS.pptx

18 Reuse of older facilities

Every facility has them: older structures containing former world-class experiments and machines, decommissioned years ago. If it comes to a project that wants to reuse those old structures for modern research often there are a lot of changes necessary to meet the current safety standards. Especially in the last three decades lots of laws and regulations experienced massive changes to improve the safety of employees, the environment and last but not least the material assets. This talk will take a closer look at the fire safety related challenges, when using old structures for new experiments.

Speaker: Fabian Saretzki (DESY)

Reuse of older facilities_Saretzki.pptx

12:00 Lunch

19 Additional Facilities and new Challenges for the Chemistry Users Community at the DESY PHOTON SCIENCE Division

The photon-science facilities at PETRA III, the world’s largest storage ring, cover approximately one quarter of the synchrotron’s total length of 2300m in 5 different buildings. Over the years, we have planned and built several chemical laboratories to support the growing user community of about 4000 user visits per year. Today, we operate a total of 7 chemistry laboratories for external and internal users. The logistics of lab allocation, parallel user support, hardware distribution, lab maintenance, and safety represent a major challenge of this operating mode.
Preparing for PETRA IV, we need to balance the advantages and disadvantages of a large, central chemical facility and the expected increase in user visits with our current arrangement of smaller and decentralized laboratories.

Speaker: Ms Anca Ciobonu (DESY)

A.Ciobanu-ITSF 2019.pptx

20 Addressing instrument safety during design phase at ESS

Speaker: Helena Ramsing (European Spallation Source ERIC)

ITSF - instrument safety in design phase.pptx

Incident/Accident Management

Convener: Bert Manzlak (Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility / Jefferson Lab)

21 DEVELOPMENT OF DISASTER PREVENTION APPLICATION FOR ACCELERATOR TUNNEL USING POSITIONING SYSTEM

To ensure the safety of workers during disasters is a common issue. In a construction site such as a tunnel, since it is a space where positioning by GPS (Global Positioning System) is difficult, it is realized to install a unique positioning system and instruct workers to move away. In order to divert it to an accelerator tunnel, the problem of radiation resistance has to be solved. We focused on wireless LANs capable of two-way communication, and performed radiation resistance tests. Access point (AP) devices were installed in the J-PARC MR accelerator tunnel to conduct research on radiation hardness including neutrons, and at the same time, irradiation tests at a Co 60 gamma ray irradiation facility was done. The radiation hardness of the AP is shown to extent up to excess 1kGy by turning off the power of the AP under irradiation, and is expected to be used in a radiation environment. In addition, we have developed a disaster prevention application that uses a positioning system, and are testing it in the J-PARC MR accelerator tunnel. The developed application not only distributes messages simultaneously by the administrator side, but also allows the worker side to distribute messages, all messages are recorded, and a read function are provided. In the future, we plan to be able to monitor the (abnormal) condition of the worker. In this forum, we will discuss past studies and future development directions.

Speaker: Koji Ishii (KEK/J-PARC)

190514ki.pdf

22 Recent trouble and measures in unsealed RI handling at RIBF

The RIKEN Nishina Center operate an accelerator facility of Radioactive Isotope Beam Factory (RIBF) which provide high-intense heavy ion beams from hydrogen to uranium using five cyclotrons. The main subject is nuclear physics, nuclear astrophysics, nuclear chemistry, biology, RI production to other facility, and etc.
Recently, some experiments using unsealed RI produced at the accelerators have been performed. While usual RI handling facilities in other laboratories or universities mainly use beta-emitter RI, the hot laboratories at RIBF handle spontaneous fission source which generate neutrons, and handle alpha emitter RI for nuclear medical research. These RI sources have higher exposure risk than usual beta-emitter RI. Furthermore, due to the increase of the amount of unsealed RI and the number of its users, several troubles have occurred during the past year. Typical cases and their solutions are introduced.

Speaker: Dr Kanenobu Tanaka (RIBF)

ITSF2019_kanenobu_tanaka.pptx

14:30 Coffee break

Incidents and lessons learned

Convener: Bert Manzlak (Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility / Jefferson Lab)

23 Incidents and Incident management @ ESS

This presentation will provide an overview of the incident management system at ESS and share lessons learned from some incidents during commissioning involving oxygen deficiency hazards

Speaker: Helen Boyer (European Spallation Source ERIC)

2019 ITSF - Incident and incident management at ESS v3.pptx

24 Injury during machining work and preventive measures against the recurrence of the accident

A serious injury during machining work occurred at J-PARC in August 2018. A contractor worker was manufacturing experimental parts for magnetic field measurements using a milling machine. When the worker was brushing off the machining dust by hand with wearing gloves, a finger of his right hand was caught in the rotating mill and got serious injury. Taking the accident, the J-PARC Center set up the working group for investigating the root causes of the incident and the preventative measures to ensure safety of the works, not only for machining works.
    There were several problems in this work. Furthermore, the team members could not caution the injured worker although they perceived the work was done under unsafe condition. These inadequate actions were caused by lack of concentration on the work and insufficient skill for safety confirmation.
    The main countermeasures are (1) confirmation of assignments of the tasks for each team member before beginning the work, (2) introduction and application of the dress code at each workplace, and (3) continuation and developments of the hazard training based on experience. Further, the expert group on machining work was set up in the J-PARC Center. The expert group prepared the safety guideline for machining work, which must be followed by all the J-PARC members. The group also implemented the mutual inspection of workplaces for machining work and gave technical suggestions to the workplace managers. Various efforts for safety in J-PARC are also reported.

Speaker: Mr Kotaro Bessho (J-PARC Center)

Bessho-190515.pdf

Bessho-190515.pptx

25 Lessons Learned Working at Height at ALBA Synchrotron facility

Health & Safety Group, ALBA Synchrotron facility, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain.

ALBA is the Spanish synchrotron facility formed with a 3GeV electron synchrotron accelerator generating bright beams of synchrotron radiation, located in Cerdanyola del Vallès (near Barcelona city).

The electrons are accelerated in a 100 MeV linear accelerator (LINAC). Then, the electron beam enters in a synchrotron accelerator named Booster that increases the energy up to 3GeV. Finally, the electron beam is stored in a synchrotron Storage Ring with a current up to 400 mA emitting synchrotron radiation (mainly in the X-ray range), tangentially to the e- trajectory. Around the Tunnel and outside the concrete shielding and tangentially to the Storage Ring, there are the experimental research laboratories; named beamlines (nowadays there are 8 installed and 4 under construction). At each beamline the scientists use the synchrotron light generated by the accelerator for a wide variety of experiments.

The aim of this work is to explain how some accidents and near misses pushed H&S Office to conduct a critical review of the works at height methods at ALBA.

In less than two years, we suffered two important accidents and one near miss at ALBA involving works at height, which triggered different actions. In this work we will explain the new equipment purchased, the design of new working methods and training and the new procedures to be applied in case of working at height at ALBA.

Speaker: Jose Aguilar

ITSF'19_Presentation_Aguilar.pptx

26 Safety at a shared construction site - ESS perspective

Safety at a shared construction site - ESS perspective

Speaker: Åsa Alström Johannesson (European Spallation Source ERIC)

Safety at a shared construction site - ESS perspective.pptx

16:40 Summary of ITSF Day 1

16:50 ESS Site Safety Induction

Wednesday, 15 May

27 ITSF 2019 - Invited speech

Skanska Construction Site

Speaker: Mrs Jenny Adholm

Sustainability strategy ESS konferens ITSF i Lund 190515.pptx

Environmental protection and sustainability

Convener: Enrico Cenni (CEA-Saclay)

28 Environmental concerns from the design to the operation of a new electrical substation

In the framework of a new 400/66/18 kV substation, equipped with a 220 MVA power transformer on the French territory, advanced environmental protection measures were implemented to retain any oil leak or extinguishing water in case of a fire. The project was subject to an environmental study prior to construction, demonstrating that the impact on the surrounding environment is negligible. The HSE Unit collaborated with the different CERN stakeholders during the design and the construction phase to ensure that the most suitable soil and water protection measures were integrated by the contracted company. The presentation will give an overview of the main outcomes of the environmental study and the main environmental concerns encountered during the design and the construction phase of the electrical substation.

Speaker: Sabrina Schadegg (CERN)

CERN_substation_S_Schadegg.pptx

29 A tool for CERN chemical agents – CERES

Following a series of environmental incidents, mainly linked to aging infrastructure, in 2015 CERN carried out an inventory and risk assessment of areas concerned by the presence of liquid chemical agents. As an outcome, HSE and the concerned services identified the need of a CERN wide chemical inventory tool, of liquids, solids and gases that also takes into account other Safety needs within the HSE Unit, such as data availability for the Fire and Rescue Service, chemical exposure issues and the support to the prevention of major accident hazards. As a result, HSE currently develops a CERN database dedicated to chemical agents available on the various sites, including geolocation, and chemical/environmental risk assessments. The tool strives to be a user-friendly web application that will be available to the HSE Unit but also to all CERN Departments storing, using or handling chemical agents.

Speaker: Charles Dagicour (CERN)

ITSF_CERES.pptx

30 Environment & Energy in focus at ESS

Speaker: Erica Lindström (European Spallation Source ESS AB)

Environment & Energy in focus at ESS (ITSF).pptx

10:15 Coffee break

Safety Culture & Behaviour

Convener: John E Anderson (Fermi Lab)

31 Emergency measures for earthquake and damage to facilities caused by earthquake in RIKEN

RIKEN Safety Management Division is in charge of safety management of research involving chemicals, high pressure gas, animals, microorganisms, radioactive isotopes, and the like. Our mission includes providing researchers with safety guidelines against disasters such as earthquake, as Japan is an earthquake-prone country.
An earthquake causes serious damage. Japan has the second highest number of earthquakes in the world. However, the number of buildings that collapse due to shakes in Japan is much smaller than that of other countries where earthquakes occur because all buildings in Japan constructed after 1981 have an earthquake-resistant structure or seismic isolation structure. There was no crack or damage to beamlines in RIBF when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in 2011. Now, what should we do first in the case of earthquake? Safety measures against earthquake that are taken in RIKEN are introduced.

Speaker: Tatsuyuki Aoshima (RIKEN Safety Division)

ITSF2019 WED1045 AOSHIMA.pptx

32 Workplace Health & Safety Committee as a Reflection of Safety Culture

The Worker-Management Health and Safety Committee is an important tool in supporting a strong health and safety culture at the Canadian Light Source. Required under Canadian legislation, Canadian companies must ensure the committee fulfills certain minimum requirements such as regular meetings and facility inspections. The mandatory committee structure creates a forum where workers and management must discuss and resolve safety issues. When considered in light of the organizations structure and life cycle, the committee activities may provide a reflection of the organizations safety culture over time.

Speaker: Mr Grant Cubbon (Canadian Light Source)

Safety Culture Presentation Lund ITSF2019 - G. Cubbon.pptx

33 Activities of Safety Promotion and Safety Management System in J-PARC

In order to ensure the safe operation of the facilities, various activities of safety management, fostering safety culture and safety education/training have been promoted in J-PARC.
In this presentation, activities about general safety shown below are introduced.
1) Management system of general safety: Committee, Expert group, Risk management (Check and review), Safety patrol
2) Safety education and training: Training based on experience, e-learning
3) Fostering safety culture: The day of safety, Safety symposium, Liaison committee for contractors
In addition, crisis managements shown below are also introduced.
1) Response in emergency
2) Drill in emergency and disaster
3) Preventive measures in disaster

Speaker: Dr Yoshihiro NAKANE (J-PARC)

Nakane_ITSF2019.pptx

34 Student Safety Program at Jefferson Lab

Students at Jefferson Lab are not considered to have sufficient practical work experience or hazard-recognition skills for the equipment or processes to which they may be exposed. They require on-the-job observation and coaching to a greater degree than would a new employee with prior experience. Students are assigned a Mentor while at Jefferson Lab. Mentors are expected to inform Students of the hazard issues associated with their tasks. Students also receive training to understand and mitigate these hazards. Mentors provide coaching and on-the job observation or assign a local supervisor to ensure that individuals who are considered "Students" receive the proper training, coaching, and oversight. The presentation will provide insight into the strategic approach regarding responsibilities and requirements necessary to ensure Student safety.

Speaker: Bert Manzlak (Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility / Jefferson Lab)

_ ITSF 19 __ Bert Manzlak __ Student Safety Program at Jefferson Lab __ May 15 2019.pptx

12:05 Lunch

Safety Training

Convener: Peter Jacobsson

35 Overcoming the moodler's block

Open source learning management systems (LMS) are quite commonly available in scientific and research organisations. Despite they are versatile and flexible when it comes to variety of content, language, access control and scoring, they are not yet very widespread in prevention and safety.
ESO HSSE has embarked on providing certain courses on-line over open-source Moodle, and shall present a possible "cookbook" for producing those modules. The idea behind this talk is to encourage and convince participating organisations' HSSE departments of the feasibility of the approach, and maybe to share course "raw material" or even complete course modules in the future.

Speaker: Mr Christian Muckle (ESO)

CMUMoodleCookbook

• CMUEnd.wmv
• CMUMoodleCook.pptx
• CMUOBS.wmv
• CMUStart.wmv
• CMUXSplit.wmv

ESOposter ESO Poster.pdf ESO Poster.pptx

36 Safety Training at ESS

Safety Training at ESS

Speaker: Lars Aprin (European Spallation Source ERIC)

PPT_~_ESS_Safety_Training_~_ITSF_2019.pptx

Continuous improvement in HSE matters

Convener: Andreas Hoppe (DESY)

37 Lead Safety at CERN

Lead has always been used at CERN for various reasons, mainly for shielding in experimental areas and laboratories, and highly misused in workshops (e. g. used as counterweight). An existing safety guideline concerning lead was already present at CERN, but it was poorly distributed to the users, that were not fully aware of the risks they were exposing themselves to. With an increased awareness of the dangers related to lead, it became clear that an action was necessary to better frame a safe usage of this material.
This talk presents the lead safety campaign carried on in the CERN Experimental Physics (EP) Department.
A detailed procedure (based on the existing guideline) for a safe handle, transport, storage and painting of lead has been written and circulated around the users of the department. After that, a survey has been done in experimental areas and workshops to understand exactly where and in which quantity lead was used/stored; the non-used lead has been radiologically checked and, depending on its state, properly stored or sent as chemical waste.
In the workshops, a sampling campaign has been done to evaluate the lead contamination level (based on the existing guideline) and it is now in progress a cleaning campaign, where necessary. The same procedure will be applied also for the laboratories; for the presence of radiologically contaminated dust, it is more difficult to implement this process in experimental areas.
At the same time, different meetings have been organized with the main stakeholders involved to increase the awareness on this topic.
In the future, a CERN wide common strategy about lead should be implemented and it is now under discussion with the other departments and units.

Speaker: Ms Di Giulio Letizia (CERN)

ITSF2019_Lead Safety_Letizia Di Giulio.pptx

38 Safety by Design Implementation in the PIP-II Project

The PIP-II Project at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory is implementing the Safety by Design process, also called Prevention through Design, to minimize occupational hazards early in the design process. The emphasis is on eliminating hazards and controlling risks to workers “at the source” or as early as possible in the life cycle of equipment, products, or workplaces. The Safety by Design process is a shift in approach for on-the-job safety. It involves evaluating potential risks associated with processes, equipment and structures. It takes into consideration the product life cycle phases from design through disposal and increases the cost-effectiveness of enhancements to occupational safety and health.

An overview of the Safety by Design process and how it is being integrated into the PIP-II Project will be presented.

Speaker: John E Anderson Jr. (Fermi National Accelerator Lab)

2019 ITSF PIP-II Safety by Design Implementation.pptx

39 An overview of CERN in-house developed software tools for Safety

The Heath, Safety and Environment Unit (HSE) at CERN makes extensive use of software tools to fulfil its mission. HSE exploits commercial solutions whenever they suit the Organization’s requirements.
If no fitting commercial solution exist, the HSE unit mandates an internal software development team to build in-house solutions, tailored to respond the specific requirements of the Organization.
This talk provides an overview of the main software tools developed in the last years, as well as the projects currently under development. The software address many different topics such as Safety Inspections, Logging and Control (SAILOR ), Tendering Support (TSA), Radiation Areas Inventory (RAISIN ), Environmental and Chemical Safety (CERES) and Radiation and Environment real-time monitoring (REMUS). This presentation will give, for each tool, an overview of its main functionality, its integration in the Organization and the delivered benefits.

Speaker: Gustavo Segura Millan (CERN)

ITSF_2019_20190515_CERN_in_house_developed_software_tools_for_Safety_SHORT.pptx

14:50 Coffee break

40 Integration of Safety thru an extended project lifecycle: example of the CERN LHC Injectors Upgrade (LIU) project

The LHC Injectors Upgrade (LIU) project aims at making the injector chains of the LHC capable of supplying the high intensity and high brightness beams requested by the High-Luminosity LHC. In addition to the construction of a new linear accelerator, the project comprises major upgrades and renovations of five existing accelerators and related surface buildings. From the Safety point of view, the objective is to maintain the present level of Safety for the people and the environment and whenever possible or required, to improve it. The major milestones to ensure this objective are the completion of the safety documentation together with the check of the compliance of the equipment and facilities to the CERN rules and regulation during the different steps of the project. Due to its extent, the project has been divided in fifteen Safety Packages (SP). The hazards generated by the new or upgraded LIU equipment or facilities are identified, the risks induced are assessed and the appropriate mitigation measures are defined. The compliance of the equipment is checked based on the applicable safety requirements for the project that are stated in documents called ‘’Launch Safety Agreements’’ (LSA). Each LIU SP has its dedicated LSA that lists the documents to deliver at each stage of the project. Once the equipment is installed and before its operation, the CERN HSE Unit carries out initial safety inspections. The final milestones is to obtain the HSE Safety Clearance, implying that the control measures listed in the safety documentation are both implemented and functional, with respect to operational safety aspects. This phase is a prerequisite to the beam operation authorisation in the related accelerator.

Speaker: Anne Funken (CERN)

ITSF-2019-LIUtalk-Funken.pptx

41 P61B Large Volume Press

The P61B Large Volume Press (LVP) extreme conditions beamline will utilize white-beam synchrotron X-ray radiation with an energy range of 30-200 keV. The structure and properties of samples can be measured in situ under extreme conditions of high pressures and temperatures. A standalone use of the Large Volume Press without beam for materials synthesis has taken up operation for experienced users. Some safety aspects for different operation conditions are being discussed.

Speaker: Sabine Lessmann (DESY)

Lessmann LVP P61B Final.pptx

Technical Risks

Convener: John E Anderson (Fermi Lab)

42 Radiation protection at ELI Beamlines facility

ELI Beamlines is the Czech Republic based pillar of the Extreme Light Infrastructure (ELI), which benefits from the latest technical development in new generation laser technology to produce high intensity ultra-short laser pulses. ELI Beamlines aims at the development of ultra-short high brilliance X-rays sources and acceleration of particle beams.
After many years of preparatory work, ELI Beamlines has entered its commissioning phase. This presentation provides an update on the status of the facility with focus on measures implemented to cover simultaneously the main hazards involved in the first operations, namely ionizing and non-ionizing (laser) radiations. Especially, technical solutions and considerations to ensure ionizing radiation protection will be discussed.

Speaker: Veronika Olsovcova (ELI Beamlines, Institute of Physics ASCR)

itsf-2019-OlsovcovaV.pptx

43 NP04 Experiment and the CERN Safety Validation Process

In the framework of the Neutrino Platform project at CERN, a new experimental area containing two experiments (ProtoDUNEs NP04 and NP02, prototypes of the DUNE detectors) has been built. Both experiments consist of an approximate cubic cryostat of 11 m side filled with liquid argon (LAr) in which a detector of about 6 m side is submerged. The NP04 detector operated with beam at the end of 2018, while NP02 is still under construction. With about 750 tons of LAr contained, NP04 represents the largest LAr TPC detector in the world and the highest concentration of cryogens at CERN.
From design to installation and operation, every stage of this project represents a new challenge in terms of safety, requiring the development of customized procedures and measures to guarantee a safe working environment.
This talk presents the NP04 experiment and its main hazards, i.e. cryogenics, HV, radiations, with the related safety measures applied. In addition, it describes the complete CERN validation process for the equipment of an experiment, taking as example the complex cryogenic system of NP04. The documentation, actions and authorizations that have to be provided by the equipment responsible person and by the safety actors are described. These are needed to guarantee the safe functioning of the system in each stage of the validation process, i.e. declaration, design, installation, commissioning and operation.
The experiment safety file, a constantly evolving set of files that accompanies the project along its entire duration, is also described.

Speaker: Olga Beltramello (CERN)

Exp_validation_CERN.pptx

44 Hazardous substance management in dynamic scientific environments

National legislation and facility-specific guidelines specify how to handle hazardous substances in commercial environments. Among other things, this includes appropriate storage and registers. The latter have to be maintained and revised at regular intervals. Scientific facilities with experimental processes, however, have a special framework that has to be considered. Dynamic experimental operation makes it hard to meet all relevant legal regulations at all times. Internal processes have to be adjusted, software solutions customized and vast organizational efforts accepted. Nevertheless, an element of uncertainty remains. This talk will offer the basis for an open discussion on whether or not it is even possible to meet all requirements and whether this really results in a safety issue.

Speaker: Sven Mohr (DESY)

ITSF2019 hazardous substance management.pptx

45 Research labs in Standardization: A new European Standard for the protection of helium cryostats against excessive pressure

New technologies emerging from High-Energy Physics labs are quickly being deployed in large scales not only within the research infrastructures but also transferred to other commercial and industrial applications. Therefore, standardization of these innovative systems and equipment is essential to ensure an acceptable level of safety and quality, in which the cooperation between research and industry is vital.
In the cryogenic safety domain, as compared to cryogenic storage vessels, helium cryostats include active components such as superconducting devices, heaters, pumps and control valves, which strongly influence the risk of excessive pressure. The European Standard "Helium cryostats – protection against excessive pressure" is therefore being developed by the working group CEN/TC 268/WG6, dealing with specific helium technology applications.
The new European Standard counts with the participation of several experts from the HEP community and main industry partners in this field. The standard will be applicable to all helium cryostats, including e.g. superconducting magnet cryostats and cryostats for superconducting radio-frequency cavities. It covers typical accidental scenarios in order to harmonise the risk assessment and common practice for the dimensioning and the design of pressure relieving systems. The EN standard is aimed to be harmonized with the European Pressure Equipment Directive.
We report on the general structure and conceptual improvements of the new Standard, as well as on the present work status.

Speaker: Andre Henriques (CERN)

ITSF19_EN_standard_He_cryostat_AHenriques.pptx

17:20 Summary of ITSF Day 2

46 ITSF Dinner

Thursday, 16 May

47 ITSF Visits to ESS & MAX IV

Info about the Site Visit.pptx

ITSF Group A Site Visit.docx

ITSF Group B Site Visit.docx

12:00 Lunch

Risk Assessment

Convener: Enrico Cennini (ESHAC Committee)

48 Safety coordination for external contractors at ALBA Synchrotron facility

Health & Safety Group, ALBA Synchrotron facility, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain
ALBA is the Spanish synchrotron facility formed with a 3GeV electron synchrotron accelerator generating bright beams of synchrotron radiation, located in Cerdanyola del Vallès (near Barcelona city).
The electrons are accelerated in a 100 MeV linear accelerator (LINAC). Then, the electron beam enters in a synchrotron accelerator named Booster that increases the energy up to 3GeV. Finally, the electron beam is stored in a synchrotron Storage Ring with a current up to 400 mA emitting synchrotron radiation (mainly in the X-ray range), tangentially to the e- trajectory. Around the Tunnel and outside the concrete shielding and tangentially to the Storage Ring, there are the experimental research laboratories; named beamlines (nowadays there are 8 running, 3 under construction and 1under design). At each beamline the scientists use the synchrotron light generated by the accelerator for a wide variety of experiments.

The aim of this work is to explain ALBA’s external contractor’s management system based in our External Contractor’s Activity Procedure: steps, process, actors, and responsibilities as well as an overview of the Spanish legal framework.
It is not easy (in our case) to be able to comply with all legal requirements and at the same time to be practical & efficient but we try to find balance.

It includes common activities as, maintenance (preventive and corrective), and construction activities and at last, services (also called very low risk activities).
So, to go deeper the best approach is the current installation of our 3 new beamlines: LOREA, XAIRA & NOTOS during the normal Synchrotron operation.

In addition I’ll talk about the steps that H&S Office did during 2016 & 2017, in order to automate and make more agile this safety coordination process with the implementation of two important software tools: Health & Safety Service Desk (Jira ALBA internal software service) and an external platform, ASEM Web Services - Integra, to manage and control the work of external contractors on our site.

Health & Safety Service Desk is one of most important H&S Office daily tools. This software is a communication channels between departments in order to foresee safety matters providing tracking of different issues, among others the external contractor activity coordination.

ASEM Web Services – Integra is an external on-line platform where external contractors should upload all the documents requested to be exchanged during the coordination process (the regular documents to be exchanged according the legislation & specific ones requested by ALBA) and it validates it.
As well as, is a channel to guarantee that external contractors has been informed about main risks of

ALBA common activity and possible affectations and at the same time, to have a tracking of this legal compliance, without detriment of face-to-face training and safety meetings, for situations where risks of special gravity are involved.

Speaker: Mrs Marmol Moreno Carme (ALBA)

ITSF'19_Presentation_Marmol.pptx

49 Evolving from the “Safety Guy” to COO — Managing Risks at a National Laboratory

The US Department of Energy (USDOE) National Labs are typically structured with an Executive Management team consisting of a Lab Director, Deputy Director for Science and a Deputy Director for Operations. The latter serves as the Laboratory’s Chief Operations Officer (COO), overseeing the mission support operations that help enable the science mission of the laboratory. A major responsibility of this role is managing the risks of operation of the laboratory. A significant number of the current COOs at the US national labs have environment and/or safety backgrounds, an indicator that the skills and knowledge acquired in this profession are directly transferable to a broader role in laboratory management. A key element of this is the identification, management and mitigation of risk. This presentation will provide an overview of the Laboratory COO role, and the using principles of risk management to balance achieving the laboratory research mission while appropriately protecting the institution.

Speaker: Mr Brian Sherin (SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory)

ITSF_2019_RiskManagement_Sherin.pdf

50 Safety assessments for HL-LHC deliverables

The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is an upgrade of the LHC to achieve instantaneous luminosities a factor of five larger than the LHC nominal value, thereby enabling the experiments to enlarge their data sample by one order of magnitude compared with the LHC baseline programme.

The HL-LHC project deliverables rank from standard industrial equipment to innovative unprecedented technologies, involving external partners in the industry and from Collaborations.

The HL-LHC Safety Office developed, in collaboration with CERN HSE unit, a systematic and scaled approach of risk assessments. Existing risk identification and evaluation processes have been revised and updated to ensure an optimized use of resources to target the safety challenges of this large-scale project.

This talk will present the risk evaluation process, as well as the workflow and information exchange between the different stakeholders. A particular attention is also paid to documentation and its archiving to allow access and retrieval during the design, installation, commissioning and operation of the different hardware. The scalability of the method will be illustrated with examples from a given equipment to an assembly of components and up to a facility.

Speaker: CHRISTELLE GAIGNANT (CERN)

ITSF2019- HiLumi-Deliverables - Safety- C Gaignant.pptx

TCLD-SafetyAssessmentForm-v1.0-1.pdf

51 Clear Communication of Safety and Health Program Expectations to Service Providers

Several negative experiences at Jefferson Lab uncovered a programmatic weakness in the way we tasked contractors providing various services. A process is being put in place to correct this deficiency.

Speaker: Mr Bill Rainey (Jefferson Lab)

Subcontractor Performance Experience 051519.pptx

14:20 Coffee break

Equipment & Certification

Convener: Andreas Hoppe (DESY)

52 CE Marking at ESS

CE Marking at ESS

Speaker: Mattias Skafar (European Spallation Source ERIC)

Equipment Certification - ITSF 2019-05-16.pptx

53 CE certification at the ESRF

The presentation describes how CE certification of equipment is handled at the ESRF. The ESRF uses many state-of-the-art, custom built equipment, which formally require CE certification. As most of these instruments are finally assembled at the ESRF, an organisation for CE auto-certification has been put in place.
The presentation will give a brief history of the process for CE certification at the ESRF, describe the formal process put in place, and give an overview of the equipment so far certified, 5 years after the process was put in place.

Speaker: Dr Paul Berkvens (ESRF)

CEmarkfull.wmv

ITSF_certification_PBerkvens_160519.pptx

thankyou.wmv

15:50 Ending of day 3, ITSF 2019

Friday, 17 May

08:25 Bus to ESS for final day

The bus leaves Scandic Star Hotel 08:25!

Technical Risk - IR camera: Technical Risk ll

Convener: Peter Jacobsson

54 Update on IR-based Helium detection system: From sketch to final technical implementation

In the course of ITSF 2017 DESY presented its approach to detect Helium leakages in superconducting infrastructure. The test setup, on which the report has been made, delivered promising results. It was therefore decided to take the next step and design a system based on infrared technology to monitor the main LINAC of the European XFEL facility. On the basis of these results, and other experiences during the tests, a system was customized to meet the requirements of different departments at DESY and exploit synergy effects. The system´s layout and operating principle may be of interest for other institutes as well.

Speaker: Sven Mohr (DESY)

Update on IR-based Helium detection system.pptx

55 The IR Camera system in operation – first experiences

Announced in the 2017’s ITSF, we would like to give you an update on our now operative IR camera system that detects Helium leaks and fires in the XTL tunnel of the XFEL accelerator. During commissioning we were even able to prove an extended detection range over a few hundred meters for bigger events. We would like to show you some videos and talk about issues we had to face and – also – technical problems we still have to solve.

Speaker: Mr Fabian Saretzki (DESY)

IR cameras_Saretzki.pptx

09:50 Coffee break

56 Retrospective look at ITSF - What have we missed?

Retrospective_look_ITSF_2019.pptx

57 Wrap-up of ITSF 2019

Speaker: Peter Jacobsson

58 ITSF 2020

ITSF2020-plan-0517.pdf

59 Closing of the ITSF 2019 and sandwiches

60 International committee meets